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INTRODUCTION
Until now we have two main approaches to the analysis of market
adjustment process, identified here as Walrasian tatonnement pro-
cess and Edgeworthian recontracting process, which depend on whe-
ther the theory focuses on interdependent optimization for the former,
or exchange mechanism for the latter. In the former the market
adjustment is supposed to be left to a Walrasian auctioneer, i. e.,
the impersonal force of the market separated from the behaviour of
active market participants. Furthermore the actual process of deli-
very and the redistribution of the endowment are not dealt there.
In other words, the model pretends to picture a decentralized eco-
nomic system, however, it presupposes a completely centralized eco-
nomic system because .it allows for no communication link between
active market participants besides via a unique market authority.
From the viewpoint which purports to explore the monetary exchange
Ostroy [7 J and Starr [10J suggest the necessity of explicit analysis
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of exchange process with the supposition that exchange is a do-it-
yourself affair for market participants. In the Edgeworthian recon-
tracting model, e. g., Debreu and Scarf [3 J the role of price which
plays in the exchange process has not been fully. treated even if the
process was described on the base of active market participant's
behaviour. A recent series of papers of game-theoretic treatment
of market exchange, e. g., Shapley [8 J and Shapley and Shubik [9 J
suggest the significance of considering the effect of agent's bidding
behaviour upon the market price formation in order to complement
the theoretical lacuna: the process or the rules by which prices
are determined may be considered to be not explicit.
In this article we follow this stream of thinking mode and formu-
late the exchange process with explicitly considering the role of
price in the process of exchange. At first we pose a natural trading
rule in the price-mediated exchange economy and define some equi-
librium concept. Then we examine the relation of this newly defined
equilibrium, Walras equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Next we ex-
plore the close relation between this equilibrium concept and the
non-\\'alrasian equilibrium (fixprice equilibrium). The recent paper
of Grandmont, Laroque and Younes [4 J characterizes the fixprice
equilibrium as a stable solution concept from the game-theoretic
point of view. Our present analysis may also be viewed as giving
another interpretation for the meaning of disequilibrium transaction
from the viewpoint of price-mediated exchange game.
Finally we give a heuristic proof of the existence of newly defined
equilibria. We employ the work of Laroque [5J as a lemma for this
propf. In his paper Laroque suggests the way for the analysis of
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disequilibrium dynamics by considering the process generated from
the outcome of game. Our present approach may accord with this
line of analysis.
Lett =!(Zl' Up WI)IET> JI denote an exchange economy with a finite
set of consumers I=lili=1,2, ... ,nland a set of commodities J=lJ
11=1,2, ... , mi. ZiCRm denotes consumer i's feasible set of net
trade (excess demand) vector, Ui denotes his utility function, and Wi
denotes his initial endowment of commodities. Concerning to the
characteristics of each agent we assume the following:
Assumption 1 : Zi is closed, convex and has a lower bound for ~
and 0 be longs to Zi'
Assumption 2: initial endowment vector Wi IS positive, and
Assumption 3: utility function IS strictly quasi-concave, monotone
increasing and continuous.
I . Propositions and' Proofs
We will define the solution concept of the price-mediated exchan-
ge economy. In order to do so, at first we will define the concept
of p-blocking in the following manner.
Definition 1: We w ill say that a coalition C can p-block the allo-
cation (XJiEI from the initial allocation (Wi)iEr is there exists a
pair of price vector p and the allocation (p, (X;)iEC), such that
[i] ~iECXi= ~iECWp
[ii] (ViE C):(~jPjXd=~jPjWiJ)
[iii] (V iE C):( U,(x i ) ~ U,(xJ) and (j iE C):( UP;,) > U,(x,)), and
[iv](V iE C):D tEla, l]):(U,(X,(t))>U,(x,))
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, where Xi denotes agent i's consumption vector, xij and Wij denote
his consumption and initial endowment of commodity j, respectively,
and x i ( t) = wi+ t (Xi - W,).
This definition differs from the usual one of cooperative market
game in two points, condition [ii] and [iv] : In the price-mediated
exchange economy any agent is naturally supposed to trade subject
to his budget constraint and in the voluntary exchange economy it is
natural to suppose that nobody can be forced to trade beyond he
wishes. With this concept of p-blocking we define the following
concepts.
Definition 2: We say that the allocation (Xi)i E I IS p-Pareto opti-
mal, when it is feasible, i.e., .BiE1X,=.B'EIW, and x,EX,=Z,+lw,1
for any agent i and it is not p-blocked by any coalition \vhich con-
sists of the whole of agents. Furthermore if the allocation (X')'E I
is feasible and it is not p-blocked by any coalition we say that
this allocation belongs to the p-core.
Morishima [6] gives a characterization of Walras equilibrium:
the allocation (XJ'EI is a Walrasian exchange equilibrium one rela-
tive to the initial alloca,tion (WJ'EI if and only if it is Pareto optimal
in the usual sense and the conditions
[a] (3 p~O):('1 iEIH.B;p;xij=.B;p,Wij)' and
[b] ('1 iEIHB tE [0, l]):(Ui(xi(t))>Ui(x,))
are satisfied, where Xi (t) = w, + t(x, - Wi)' We are now considering
the economy where any exchanlSe is carried out price-mediatedly.
So we will employ the following one as the solution concept.
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Definition 3: We say the pair of price vector and the allocation
(p, (Xi)iEI) a price-mediated exchange eq,uilibrium relative to the ini-
tial allocation (Wi)iEI when it is p-Pareto optimal and the above two
conditions [a] and. [b] are satisfied.
Remark: As the direct consequence of Morishima's result we can
state that the pair of price vector and the allocation (p, (XJi E/) is
a Walrasian equ.ilibrium if and only if it is a price-mediated ex-
change equ iIibrium and the allocation (xJ i E I is Pareto optima I in
the usual sense. As a corollary of ,this result we can say that any
price -med ia ted exchange equi Iibr ium allocation except for Wal ras ian
exchange equilibrium one is not Pareto optimal in the usual sense.
This result partially characterizes the concept of equilibrium in the
price-mediated exchange.
We say that the price-mediated exchange equilibrium except for
Walrasian equilibrium is a non-trivial price-mediated exchange equi-
librium. In the following we confine our analysis to the non-trivial
price-mediated exchange equilibrium. We will consider the' exchange
economy where there are two commodities. By examining the relation
of the non-trivial price-mediated exchange equilibrium to the non-
Walrasian equilibrium (fixprice equilibrium) we use a heuristic me-
thod of proof of the existence of non-trivial price-mediated exchange
equilibrium instead of going to the direct way for it. We begin with
defining the following concept.
Definition 4: We say that the allocation (Xi)i EI is constrained
Pareto optimal at a given price vector p with respect to the initial
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allocation (Wi)i E I when the following conditions are satisfied:
[i] L;'EIX,=L;'Elw"
[ii] (ViEJ):(XiEX" L;jpjxiJ=L;jpjwiJ ),
[iii] there does not exist the allocation (Xi)iEIE y(p)
such that (V iE J):(Ui(X,)~Ui(Xi))and( 3 iE I):(U,(x,»U,(x,))
,where y(p)=J(Xi)iE/IL;iEIX, =L;iEIWi and
(ViEJ):(xiEX" L;jpjx iJ =L;jpjwiJ )! ,and
[iv] (V iE J):( BtE [0, l]):(Ui(xi ( t)) > U,(x,)).
It is trivial that any price-mediated exchange equilibrium IS const-
rained Pareto optimal. Here we will have the following properties
of the constrained Pareto optimal allocation.
Property 1 : The pair (p, (X')iEI) is suppos~d to be constrained
Pareto optim,al. Let Zi(P) denotes agent i's Walrasian net trade
vector at the price vector p. Then
(V iEI):(ZiJ(p)ZiJ ~O and IZiJl~lz,Jp)l) and
·(V iEI):(Zi =ll',z,(p))
,where z; =xi-w, and 0 ~ll', ~1.
This property can be easily verified by noting the condition [iv] of
the constrained Pareto optimal and the strict quasi-concavity of
utility function.
Property 2: The pair (p, (Xi)iEl) is supposed to be constrained
Pareto optimal. Let us define the set .f=liEI IZi =\=z,(p)1. Then
(V i, kEY):((ZiJ(p) -ZiJ)(Zkj(p) -Zkj) > 0).
Proof: Suppose that (3 h, kEJ):((Zhj(P) -Zhj)(Zkj(P) -Zkj) <0).
Then there exist Xh , AkE(O, 1) such that
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Ah(Xhi(P) -XhJ +A,,(Xkj(p) -Xki ) =0, where 'Xh(P) =Zh(P) +Wh'
Here we define the new allocation (xILEI
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such that Xh=Xh+Ah(Xh(P) -xh )
XIl: = X" + A,,(.X,,(p) - x,,)
'X'i = Xl for any agent i =\= h, k.
Then we can easily show that this new allocation (X;)l EI E y(p).
Furthermore by noting the strict quasi-concavity of utility function
it follows that Uh(X h) > Uh(Xh), U,,(x,,) > U,,(x,,), and U/(xJ = UI(xJ
for any agent i =\= h, k. This contradicts the constrained Pareto opti-
mality of (p,(X/)/El)' This completes the proof.. 11
Property 3 : The pair (p, (x i )/ EI) is supposed to be constrained
Pareto optimal. Let us define the following sets:
.I(j)=!iEIl zu =\=zu(p)l,
I+(j) = 1iE II ZU > 0 I, and
I-(j)=!iEIlzu <01-
Then it is not possible that ./(j)nI+(j) =\=r/> and..f(j) nI-(j) =\=r/>.
Proof: Suppose that there exist some agent hE..f(j)n P(j) and
agent kE.I(j) nI-(j). Then from Property 1 it follows that
0< Zhi < Zhi(P) and Zki(P) < Zki < 0,
that is (ZhJ(P) -Zhi)(:Zki(P) -Zki) <0.
This contradicts the property 2. This completes the proof. II
Here we give the definition of a fixprice equilibrium, following
Benassy [1] and consider its relation to the constrained Pareto
optimality.
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Definition 5 : We say the pair (p, (xJ, E/) a fixprice equilibrium
with respect to the initial allocation (WJ'E/ when the following
conditions are satisfied:
[i] ('V' iE S(P)):(Zi=Z,(P)),
[ii] ('V' iEL(p)):(lzijl~lzij(p)l, ZijZij(p)~O, and pZ,=O), and
[iii] ~'E/Zi =0
, where S(p)=liEllzij(p)~iE/zii(p)~Ol and
L(p) = 1iEII Zij(p) ~iE /Zij(P) > 0 I.
That is, S(p) denotes the set of agents on the short side of the
market at p and L(p) denotes the set of agents on the long side of
the market.
Proposition 1 : The allocation (XJi EI is constrained Pareto opti-
mal at a given price vector p with respect to the initial allocation
(W,)iEI if and only if the pair (P,(XJ'E/) is a fixprice equilibrium.
Proof: At first we show the "only if" (necessity) part. Suppose
that the pair (P,(XJiE/) is constrained Pareto optimal. Then by no-
ting the feasibility of allocation and Property 1 it follows that con-
dition [ii] and [iii] of the fixprice equilibrium are satisfied. Hence
it suffices to show that Zi =z,(p) for any iE S(p). Without loss of
generality we assume that ~iE/Zij(P)>0 for some commodity j.
Then S(p)=liEllzij(p)~OI and L(p)=!iEI!zu(p»Of. For any
agent i such that Zij(p) = 0 we can state that Zi = Zi(P). Therefore
we must show that for any agent iES-=liEllzu(p)<OI, z,=z,(p).
Now suppose that there exists some agent iE 5- such that Zi =FZi(p).
Then from Property 3 we know that for any agent iEI+=L, Zi
= Zi(P). Then
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O>L:'ESZ'j>L:'ESZ<J(P) and
L:'ELzu=L:'ELZu(p) >0.
From this fact it follows that O=L,'EIZU>L"EIZU(P)' This contra-
dicts the supposition that L:'EIZO(P) > O.
The "if" (sufficiency) part proceeds as follows. Suppose that the
pair (p, (x.), El) is a fixprice equilibrium. It is trivial that conditions
[i], [ii], and [iv] of the constrained Pareto optimality are satisfied
by this pair. Hence we must show that the condition [iii] of the
constrained Pareto optimality is satisfied. Suppose that the pair
(p, (X,)'EI) did not satisfy the condition [iii], that is, there existed an
allocation (x,LEI E y(p) such that (V iEI):(U,(x.) ~ U,(x.)) and
(:I iEI):(U,(x.) > U,(x,)). For any agent iES(p), x,=x" because of
the fact that x, =x,(p) for any iE S(p). Hence, if there exists some
agent i such that U,(x.) > U,(x,), then this agent iEL(p) and for
him it must hold that IZol> IZul. Then we have L:'EL IZul >
L:'EL IZul and L,'Es IZul=L,'ES IZul. Hence L:iEI Zu='FO. This
contradicts the supposition that (x,), El E y(p). These considerations
complete the proof. II
With these preliminary analyses we will give the following char-
acterization of the price-mediated exchange equilibrium.
Proposition 2: The pair (p,(X')'EI) is a price-mediated exchange
equilibrium, if and only if it is constrained Pareto optimal and there
exists no price vector P ='F p and its corresponding fixprice equilib·
rium allocation (x,(P))'EI such that (V iEI):( U,(x,(p)) ~U,(x.)) and
(:I iEI):(U,(x,(p)) >U,(x,)).
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Proof: The "only if" (necessity) part is trivial. The "if" (suffi-
ciency) part proceeds as follows. It suffices to show that the allo-
ca tion (Xi) i EI is p-Pareto optimal when the 'if clause: is sati~fied.
We will show this by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that the allo-
cation (X')'EJ is not p-Pareto optimal. Then there exists some pair
(p, (iJ,EJ) such that- the coalition I p-blocks the allocation (XJ'EJ
from the initial allocation (w,)'EJ' by the pair (P,(X,),Ei)' If the pair
(p, (iJ,EI) is a fixprice equilibrium, it contradicts the above
condition of Propos ition 2. Hence the pair (p, (x,), E J) must not be
a fixprice equilibrium, which implies that the allocation (XJ'EJ is
not constrained Pareto optima! by noting Propos ition 1. Then there
exist a fixprice equilibrium allocation (Xt(P)),EJ such that (\7' iEI):
(U,(x,(p)) ;;;;;'U,(X,)) and (::3 iEI):(Ut(x,(p)) > U,(X,)). However this im-
plies that the fixprice equilibrium allocation (Xi(j»))iE 1 satisfies the
relation that (\7' iEI):(U,(X,(p));;;;;' U,(x,) and (::3 iEI):(U,(x,(p)) > U,
(x,)). This contradicts the condition of Propos ition. 2. These cons i-
derations complete the proof. II
Next in order to make above contentions clear we. give a graphical
example of the two commodity and two agent case. We consider the
economy with two agents indexed i and k, and two commodities In-
dexed 1 and 2. We will explain by using the usual Edgeworth's box-
diagram. We denote the agent i's origin by 0, and the agent k's
origin by Ok. The horizontal axis measures the quantity of commodi-
ty 1 and the vertical axis measures the quantity of commodity 2.
Let w=(w" Wk) denote the initial allocation. We denote OC , as
the agent i's offer curve (price-consumption curve) and OC k as the
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agent k's offer curve. In Figure 1 the point C(w) indicates the
Walrasian equilibrium allocation. The set of fixprice equilibrium
allocations are the set of allocations on the closed curve w C(w)w.
For example, if the price vector is given by p, the point F indicates
the fixprice equilibrium allocation relative to this price vector. In
the 'case of Figure 1, however, this point F IS not a price-mediated
exchange equilibrium. Because there exists a price vector p such
that the corresponding fixprice equilibrium allocation (i. e. point G)
is mutually advantageous. Here L denotes agent i's indifference cur·
ve and h denotes agent k's indifference curve. The shaded region
indicates the set of allocations which are mutually advantageous
than the point F. Hence the fixprice equilibrium allocation such as
the point F is not likely to be a satisfactory description of the
equilibrium in the price-mediated exchange economy.
How can we describe the set of price-mediated exchange equilib·
rium a lloca tion. By us ing Propos i tion 1 and Propos ition 2, we know
that the price-mediated exchange equilibrium allocation is a fixprice
equilibrium allocation such that this allocation cannot be improved by
any other fixprice equilibrium allocation. If offer curves and indif-
ference curves are drawn in Figure 2, the set of price-mediated
exchange equilibrium allocation is the set of allocation on the·curve
MC( w)N, where point M denotes the tangent point of agent i's offer
curve and agent k's i'ndifference curve, and the point N denotes the
tangent' point of agent k's offer curve and agent i's indifference
curve.
The price-mediated exchange equilibrium includes two representa·
tive concept of equilibrium. The one is the Walrasian competitive
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eq,uilibrium allocation depicted by the point C(w). The other is the
monopo lis tic eq,uilibrium a lloca tion depicted by the points M and N.
For example, the point M is the best point of agent k among the
allocation on the reaction curve OCt when the agent i behaves as a
price-taker. Hitherto we have not dealt explicitly the number and
the relative size of market participants. By considering this aspect
it will be possible to characterize two representative equilibria
from the price-mediated exchange game.
Next we will prove the existence of price-mediated exchange equi-
libria. We can show the existence of Walrasian competitive equi-
libria under the Assumptions 1 -3. By noting Remark, Walrasian
competitive equilibrium is a price-mediated exchange equilibrium,
hence we have already known that the set of price-mediated exchange
equilibrium is not empty. We named the price-mediated exchange
equilibria except for Walrasian competitive equilibria non-trivial
price-mediated exchange equilibria. Therefore in the following we
will show the existence of non-trivial price-mediated exchange
equilibria under some regularity conditions.
Proposition 3: Suppose that the aggregate excess demand function
satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference and tKe following
conditions are satisfied:
[i] ('v' iEIHz; Elnt Zt,and Zt(p) is differentiable), and
[ii] (:I iEIHZ: =\= 0)
, where z; denotes agent i's Walrasian net trade vector and Int Zt
denotes the interior of Zt. Then there exist non-trivial price-medi-
ated exchange equilibria.
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In order to prove this proposition we use the following lemma
which is due to Laroque [5J
Lemma: Let (p*, (ZiliE I) be locally stable competitive equilibrium
under the Walrasian Hitonnement process. Suppose that the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied:
[iJ (V iEIHz,! EInt Zi, and zJp) IS differentiable), and
[iiJ (:J iEIHz,! =\= 0).
Then (:J N(p*) H v pE N(p*)):(p=\=p*);(( V iE L(p)): (Ui(x;(p)) > Ui(xi)))
, where N(p*) is a closed neighborhood of p* and xt(p) is agent i's
consumption vector of fixprice equilibrium at p, and x'!=z'! + Wi'
Proof of Proposition 3: The conditions of Proposition 3 suffice
to apply Lemma. Hence by using Lemma, we have
(V iEL(p)):(pEN(p*) and p =\=P*):(Ui(X,(P)) > Ui(Xi(P*)).
eh'oose any p,where p =\=p* and pEN(p*)nlplp=(Pt,l), O;;;;Pt;;;;p{l
For any chosen agent kE L(p) we consider the following problem;
Max Uk(Xk(P))
pEN(p*) n Q
, where Q= Ip Ip= (PI' 1), 0 ;;;;p, ;;;;p;! and xk(p) is agent k's consump-
tion vector of fixprice equilibrium at p. Denote the set of solutions
by Q and define P= (max_ PI> 1). Then in the following we will show
pEQ
that the pair (p, (Xi(P))iE/) is a non-trivial price-mediated exchange
equilibrium.
From the definition of pE tlCN(p*) it follows that p =\=p*. And it
is obvious from the definition of constrained Pareto optimality and
Proposition 1 that the pair (p,(X;(P))iE/) satisfies the conditions [aJ
and [b] of price-mediated exchange equilibrium. Hence, by noting
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Proposition 2 it suffices to show that
(Vp ~O):(p +p):(( j iEI):(U,(X,(p))> U,(X,(p))) or
(V iE Il:( U,(x,(p))~U,(x,(p)))).
Step 1: (VpE(N(p*)n Q)\Q):( j iEI):(U,(X,(p)) > U,(x,(p))). From
the definition of Q we can say that
(V pE (N(p*) n Q) \ Q):( U,/..x,/p)) > U,/..x,/..p))).
Step 2: (VP~O and pEEQ):((j iEI):(U,(x,(p))>U,(x,(p))) or
(V iE I):(U,(x,(p)) ~ U,(x,(p)))).
We will show this by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that
( j P ~ 0 and P EE Q): (( V iE I);(U,(x,(p)) ;;;; U,(x,(p))) and
(j iE I): ( U,(x,(p)) < U,(x,(p)))).
Then we can show that the following statements are true;
and
(b) (V iEL(p)):((Pl >PI and U,(x,(p));;;;U,(x,(p))) imply zil(pkO).
First we will show the statement (a) by reductio ad absurdum. Sup-
pose that (j iE S(p)): (PI >PI and U,(x,(p));;;; U,(x,(p)) and Zil(P)~O).
Define Z, by z,= az,(p)+ (1- a)z,(p) , where aE (0,1).
Then from the strict quasi-convavity of U, we have U,(Z,+ wJ >
U,(z,(p)+w,). When Zil(P)~O, it follows that pz,=apz,(p);;;;apz,(p)
=0. By noting the fact that (V iE S(p)):(z,(p)=z,(p)), this contra'-
diets the definition of z,(p). Hence the statement (a) ~as shown to
be true.
Next we will show the statement (b) by reductio ad absurdum.
Suppose that (j iEL(p)): (PI >PI and U,(x,(p));;;;U,(x,(p)) and Zil(P)
~O). From the definition of pEN(p*) we have already shown that
for any iE L(p), U,(x,(p))> U,(xi).
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Hence (ViEL(p)):(u.(x,(p))>UJxi)). Define Z,
Z,= az,(p)+(l-a) z,(p*) ,where aE(O, 1).
Then from the strict quasi-concavity of U, we have U,Cz, (+ wJ>
U,(zi+wJ. When z,,(p)~O, it follows that p*z,=ap*zJp);;i"pz,(p)=O
because PI >pt, This fact contradicts the definition of zJp*). Hence
the statement (b) was shown to be true.
From the above statements (a) and (b) we can say that
(( 3 p~ 0 and pEE Q):( ViE I): (U,(x,(p) )~ UJxJp))) implies
(V iEI):(Z,,(p)<O).
This contradicts the feasibility of the allocation (xJp)), EJ' i. e.,
~ ,E/Z,(P)=O. Hence it was sh'own to be true that
(Vp~O and pEE Q):(( 3 iEI):(UJxJp))> UJxJp))) or
(V iE I):(U,(x,(p))~U,(x,(p)))).
"tep Q. l'Hp?=nIUIQ\'TI",*\)).(",±.nl.I(:J iEn.IU(xl.nll>UI¥I",ll)
>...J OJ. \ V ......... ~ \ l"qjJ'. f./ \ jJ/.\ =:J II .1./.\ i i\1-'1I i\,Ni\jJ/I or
(V iE I):(U,(x,(p)) ~ UJx,(p)))). We will show this by reductio ad
absurdum.
Suppose that ( 3 pE QU (Q\ N(p*))):(p ~p):((ViE I):(UJx,(p));;i" U,(x,(p)))
and (3 iE 1):( Utlx,(p))< UJx,(p)))). Then we can shqw that the follow-
ing s ta tements are true;
and
First we will show the statement (c) by reductio ad absurdum. Sup-
pose that (3 iE S(p)): (PI <PI and U,(x,(p));;i" U,(xi(p)) and Zil(P);;i"O).
Define Ziby Z,=azi(p)+(l-a)z,(p) ,where aE(O,l). Then
from the strict quasi-concavity of Ui we have U,(Zi+ wJ> UJxJp)).
When z"(p);;i,,O, it follows that PZi = apzi(p);;i" apz,(p) = O. By noting
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the fact that (\;j iE S(p)):(ZM))=Zi(P)), this contradicts the definition
of z,(p). Hence the statement (c) was shown to be true.
Next we will show the statement (d) by reductio ad absurdum. Sup-
pose that (V iEL(p)):(PI <PI and U;(x,(p))~U,(x,(p)) and ztJ(p)~O).
Define Z, by Zi = az,(p) +(1- a)zi(p) ,where aE (0,1). Then from the
strict quasi-concavity of U, we have U,(z,+ wJ> U,(xi(p)). In the
meanwhile, from the weak axiom of revealed preference and Walras'
Law we have (VP=\=P*):((PI-P;")~'E/Z'I(P)<O).Hence it follows
that (v iEL(p)):(PI <p.,*):(ZtJ(p»0). By noting the definition of fix-
price equilibrium and the supposition that Ui(X,(P))~Ui(Xi(P)) it can
be seen that ztJ(p)=\=O for any iEL(p). Hence, when ztJ(p)<Oand
PI <PI, it follows that (:I iiE(O, l)):(z,(Ci)~(O,0)), where z,(ii)=iizi(P)
+(1-ii)Zi(P). From the monotonicity of Ui we have U,(z,(ii)+wtl~
Ui(Wi). From the definition of fixprice equilibrium we have Ui(Xi
(p))~ U'(wtl. Hence it follows that Ui(X,(P))~Ut{zi(Ci) + wtl. This is
a contradiction. Accordingly the statement (d) was shown to be
true. From the above two statements (c) and (d) we can say that
((:I pE QU(Q\ N(p*))):(p=\=p):(V iEI):(Ui(X,(P))~Ui(XiCP)))) implies
(V iE I):(ztJ(p) >0). This contradicts the feasibility of (x,(P))'EI ,i.e.
~iEIZi(P)=O. Hence it was shown to be true that (VpEQU(Q\N
(p*))):(p =\=p):(( :I iEI):( Ui(Xi(P))> U,(Xi(P))) or (V iE I):(U,(Xi(P))~Ui
(x,(p)))). This cons ideration completes the proof. II
IT. Concluding Rerp-urk
This article intends to analyze the exchange process mediated by
prices. We fundamentally follow the stream of thinking mode empha-
s iz ing the need of ana lys is of so-ca lIed 'market coodina tion problem'
- 93-
494
by Clower and Leijonhufvud [2]. We provide a natural trading rule
and a new equilibrium concept (price-mediated ~xchange equilibrium)
and consider its relation to the Walras equilibrium and non-Walra-
sian equilibrium (fixprice equilibrium). When we intend to analyze
the exchange process sys tema tically, at least following problems
may be worthy to be considered. First, the dynamic analysis of the
exchange process. Our heuristic proof of existence of equilibria
suggests the way for this analysis. Second problem is a specifica-
tion of equilibrium under the possible conditions of information.
The exchange process can be viewed as a communication process.
The contractual form of exchange may 'naturally reflect the infor-
mation condition: the dispersion of information, the degree of free-
dom of communication, the cost of communication etc. So that the
second problem may be suit to the game-theoretic representation in
s tra tegic form (or normal form): we expl ic itly cons ider the reaction
'or interaction of other agents or groups when we specify some
agent',s behaviour. Furthermore we must treat this problem in re-
lation to the number and the relative size of market participants.
These are worthy of further investigations.
* This research was partly financially supported by the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science and the Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
- 94-
M. Maruyama, Price-Mediated Exchange Equilibrium
References
495
[ 1 J Benassy, J. P., "Neokeynesian Disequilibrium Theory in a Monetary Econ-
omy, " Review of Economic Studies (1975), pp. 503-523.
[2J Clower, R. W. and A. Leijonhufvud, "The Coordination of Economic Acti-
vities: A Keynesian Perspective," American Economic Review (1975), pp.
182-194.
[ 3 J Debreu, G. and H. Scarf, "A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy, "
International Economic Review (1963), pp.235-246.
[4J Grandmont, J. M., G. Laroque, and Y. Younes, "Equilibrium with Quantity
Rationing and Recontracting, ", Journal of Economic Theory (1978), pp.84-
102.
[ 5 J Laroque, G., :'On the Dynamics of Disequilibrium: A Simple Remark,"
Review of Economic Studies (1978), pp.273-278.
[6J Morishima, M., Walras' Economics, Cambridge University Press (1977).
[ 7 J Ostroy, J. M., "The Informational Efficiency of Monetary Exchange,"
American Economic Review (1973), pp. 597-610.
[ 8 J Shapley, L. S., "Noncooperative General Exchange," in Theory and Mea-
surement of Economic Externalities, ed. by S. A. Y. Lin Academic' Press
(1976) .
[9J Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik, "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means
of Payment," Journal of Political Economy (1977), pp.937-968.
[10J Starr, R. M., "The Structure of Exchange in Barter and Monetary Eco-
nomies," Quarterly Journal of Economics (1972), pp.290-302.
- 95-
